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Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item. Despite significant progress to meet resolution objectives, concerns remain as to whether the present arrangements will work effectively in the event of a systemic crisis. Requisite skepticism centres on three key issues. First, whether bailing in the creditors of a cross-border institution, including the conversion of pre-funded liabilities in the guise of total loss-absorbing capital (TLAC) 10 or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), See FSB, "Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Principles and Term Sheet" (9 November 2015), online: <www.fsb.org/2015/11/total-loss-absorbing-capacity-tlac-principles-and-term-sheet/>. 11 Under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (art 45) and derivative legislation, EU banks must have a minimum cushion of regulatory capital and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities and own funds of the institution (MREL), which is the EU way of implementing the FSB TLAC standard. Doubts persist, however, as to whether MREL can cure the weaknesses of the EU resolution framework. See E Avgouleas & C Goodhart, "An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins: Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal would prove sufficient to prevent the bailout of a global systemically important financial institution (G-SIFI). Second, there are possible undesirable consequences associated with bailins when the failure is systemic rather than idiosyncratic. These issues are discussed at great length in our earlier publications.
12 A third concern is whether there is sufficient liquidity to support a bank resolution. While this concern is pertinent to G-SIFI failures, the liquidity arrangements of domestic banks in resolution can also be unclear.
Other aspects of the resolution debate focus on the time horizon for the valuation of failing banks' losses 13 and the possibility of managerial and regulatory forbearance when there are fears that bailing-in bank creditors in an unstable market may heighten contagion. Another concern is the extent to which the reformed resolution regimes are sufficient to mitigate moral hazard, especially in the absence of an ex post penalty regime for bank managers.
14 The last issue also relates to the question of whether current resolution regimes are premised on clear normative objectives. While the latter might sound more theoretical than practical, it is, in our view, a matter of cardinal importance. The normative values attached to any public policy regime are not merely expressed in its statutory objectives but also reflect and signal its implicit values, rationales and expected utilities. This lack of clarity and the overlapping and sometimes conflicting nature of resolution objectives under present frameworks are a key part of this chapter's analysis.
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections following the present introduction. The second section unbundles the normative objectives of contemporary resolution regimes, highlighting inconsistencies and shortcomings. In this context, we advocate a more relaxed approach to the provision of liquidity in resolution to avoid fire sales or when relying on depressed valuations influenced by fire sales. The third section focuses on the implications of draconian creditor bail-in regimes and the timing of valuations. The fourth section concludes. 
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E Avgouleas & C Goodhart, "Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins" (2015) 1:1 J Financial Reg 3, online: <https://academic.oup.com/jfr/article/1/1/3/2357875>. 13 Uncertainty concerning overall losses is associated with the timing and method of calculation of the value of bank assets with discrepancies between valuation when the bank enters resolution and at certain fixed points in future when the same assets might have recovered for some value. Thus, the timing of valuation is a matter of fundamental importance not just for the distribution of bank losses but also for observing the "no creditor worse off" (NCWO) principle.
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Express and Implicit Objectives of Bank Resolution Regimes: The State of Confusion
The Microprudential Dimension
Arguably the foremost objectives of bank resolution regimes are microprudential, regardless of the resolution technique that authorities choose to resolve a bank. The first microprudential goal is securing an orderly exit through an expedited legal process involving the restructuring, sale or liquidation of the affected institution and/or pre-accumulated debt cushions (for example, contingent convertibles [CoCos], TLAC and MREL) that can be converted into equity to recapitalize the bank or written-off to absorb losses. The second microprudential objective of a bank resolution regime is the ex ante improvement of bank governance by augmenting risk controls and limiting leverage. This can be achieved by the close monitoring of creditors who want to avoid the cost of a bail-in. In addition, the risk of being bailed-in means that creditors ask a higher return for the money they lend to the bank raising the cost of bank funding enough to eliminate the TBTF subsidy. 15 
The Moral/Normative Dimension: A Political Economy Analysis
Resolution regimes have a number of explicit and implicit moral/normative goals that flow from or overlap with the aforementioned micro and macroprudential aspects of resolution regimes. The first is mitigating moral hazard, based on the desire to force banks to internalize operational costs by following the "polluter pays" principle, for example, curbing the TBTF subsidy and eliminating the possibility of public bailouts. The second moral/normative goal is to restore market discipline by restricting the funding of bailouts and other advantages pertaining to TBTF banks. From this flows a third moral goal, namely the Schumpeterian cycle.
A properly calibrated resolution regime should facilitate the market exit of failing underperforming banks, while providing opportunities for new market entrants. The
Schumpeterian cycle theorizes that underperformers would otherwise be sustained by public subsidies. Indeed, the expeditious and orderly exit of underperformers or restructuring in a controlled environment are important for overall economic efficiency, market competition characterized by a "level playing field" and the attainment of transparent capitalism. 
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The fourth apparent normative goal is the "punishment" of placid creditors. The implicit moral goals that flow from the microprudential and macroprudential aspects of the regime require interpretation, predominantly from a political economic analysis perspective. Thus, they are subject to dispute and none more than the apparent "punitive" nature of the regime.
22 If the goal of the regime is, however, the containment of moral hazard, a punitive aspect may be inevitable for deterrence purposes. But instead of merely relying on super-rational and expert creditors, who can play the role of effective bank management monitors -admittedly a minority among bank creditors -resolution regimes should target the two constituents: bank management and large shareholders whose opportunistic behaviour is the key source of moral hazard. Furthermore, the punitive aspects of the bail-in may prove counterproductive in the context of resolution frameworks that should primarily focus on orderly exit. They may incentivize bank management to delay the resolution process for as long as possible, if their views can influence regulators' decisions. In addition, the question remains as to who should be "punished": the incompetent, the unlucky, the rent-seekers or the risk-takers? Shifting the cost of bank failures from taxpayers to bank creditors via bail-ins, often means nothing other than a fundamental shift of this cost from one social group to another. 23 The punitive approach would nonetheless be better defended if it was targeting bank management and large shareholders, even by means of ex post penalties.
Finally, the competitive pricing of banks' funding to reflect true levels of bank riskiness, since bail-in regimes remove the shield of bailouts from senior creditors, may have some impact on shareholder and management appetite for risk and leverage, which seem to be symbiotic. 24 Thus, it may reinforce market discipline and make banks safer. However, it may not prove as effective as anticipated unless complemented by a prudential regime that is geared towards boosting equity buffers.
Interest rates are critical for the level of risk assumed by banks and for attracting capital investment in the banks. A sustained period of very low interest rates typically leads to riskier lending with higher yields to keep the banks' ROE ratios from collapsing. This predictable lending behaviour also leads to the accumulation of concealed risks on banks' balance sheets.
At the same time, a long period of ultra-low interest rates eats into banks' profitability and makes bank equity a less than attractive investment. In a crisis, low interest rates and relatively 7 high costs of equity funding may prove more critical to banks' risk-taking behaviour and solvency than the TBTF subsidy.
Taxation regimes also impact on the cost of equity in a way that influences the mix of bank funding, capital structure and leverage even when the TBTF subsidy is diminished. 25 Moreover, operating efficiencies, technological advantages, investment in research and development, client networks, economies of scale and scope also create funding advantages.
Similarly, the level of market dominance 26 is the result of a combination of factors as already mentioned and not just the result of the TBTF subsidy or of its absence.
Bail-in's Moral Hazard, Post-resolution Challenges and Some Remedies
Bail-in's Moral Hazard
The goals of the bail-in process are different in each jurisdiction. In the United States, the process for a bail-in and conversion of creditor claims is embedded in the resolution regime for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), the so-called Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). 27 When a bail-in process is triggered under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act the aim is to provide sufficient capital buffers for a subsidiary company to continue operations following the liquidation of its holding company. Nonetheless, the feasibility of the OLA process has not been tested during a crisis.
28
In the European Union, on the other hand, the "doom-loop" between bank instability and sovereign indebtedness has presented member state governments with a major problem. 37 The subsequent performance of Italian banking stocks reinforces this view. As a relevant BIS study states: "Overall, the FTSE Italia All Share Banks index climbed by 10% from the beginning of June to the end of July, outperforming the STOXX Europe 600 Banks index, which returned nearly 5%." See Bilyana Bogdanova & Mathias Drehmann, "How did markets react to bank distress in Europe?" (2017) BIS Q Rev, online: <www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709u.htm>. 38 For excellent analysis of the problems raised by the relevant investor (bondholder) compensation arrangements see Micossi, supra note 35 at 10-12. These examples, and especially the rescue of MPS, demonstrate that draconian bail-in regimes can have serious undesirable consequences that can weaken rather than strengthen market discipline.
Moreover, all forms of insurance raise the issue of moral hazard. The certainty that sufficient specially designated liabilities, such as CoCos (i.e., for a going-concern bank), TLAC and MREL, once resolution has been triggered, will be in place to provide adequate loss absorption is no exception. For example, convertible debt capital cushions proved insufficient to prevent the insolvency of the two Veneto banks nor did they prevent Spain's Banco Popular from entering into resolution. 46 Specifically, in an effort to keep the two Veneto banks solvent, . 48 In all of these cases no further creditor bail-in action was taken.
The Critical Matter of Asset Valuation in Resolution
The bail-in process cannot properly function unless bank losses are identified in a finite form.
Bank losses, including unrealized future losses, must be accurately determined to avoid successive rounds of bail-in losses accruing to bank creditors. This can be challenging in practice. For example, bank losses have been consistently underestimated, both in the Global
Financial Crisis and subsequently in the European crisis. The valuation of assets is an inexact science and market cyclicality further complicates the appraisal task. 49 In the uncertain conditions when the market is experiencing generalized asset value declines, the new (incoming) accountants, employed by the resolution agency, are likely to take a bad or a worstcase scenario as their baseline for identifying losses. Previously, the accountants of the failing bank itself would have been encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view of the value of its assets. Thus, the transition from the bank's accountants to those of the resolution authority is likely to cause a huge discontinuity in the form of a massive drop in published accounting valuations. Furthermore, there is the issue of a potential rise in the valuation of bank assets once the first shock has subsided. This may also be found by factoring in the difference between the current market value of the failing bank's assets and their long-term economic value, though, admittedly, the latter is a controversial concept. 47 Ibid at 2.
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See T Hale, "Investors sue Brussels over Banco Popular sale", FT.com (17 August 2017), online: <www.ft.com/content/b96003b4-8335-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd> ("International investors have launched legal action against the European authorities that oversaw the failure of Banco Popular, in the latest attempt to overturn the decisions that led to the bank's sale to Santander in June for €1"); F Guarascio, "Investors file 51 lawsuits against EU for shutting Banco Popular", Reuters.com (30 August 2017), online: <www.reuters.com/article/bancopopular-ma-investors/investors-file-51-lawsuits-against-eu-for-shutting-bancopopular-idUSL8N1LF3BA> ("Disgruntled investors have filed 51 lawsuits against European Union regulators for shutting Spain's Banco Popular, marking one of the largest legal challenges yet to the EU and a fresh attack on the bloc's rules on bank rescues. The deluge of cases, filed with the European Union's General Court, are the first legal test of how the EU applies new bank rules aimed at forcing investors to bear the costs of rescuing a failing lender before taxpayer money is used"). 49 Bank failures during boom conditions (resulting from fraud, such as Barings, for example) are easier to handle, with less risk of contagion. conformity with the NCWO principle. The reason for this is twofold. First, in an insolvency, creditors' losses are judged ex post once the firm has been liquidated or sold and the assets have been disposed of, whereas in a resolution, bank losses are determined either when the bank enters into resolution or shortly thereafter. Asset prices in resolution are normally marked against a depressed market, and both bank sales and asset sales are bound to attract a limited number of buyers, which compromises the concept of competitive market prices. The possibility of discrepancies in valuations upon entry into resolution and ex post valuations is also recognized by European Banking Authority (EBA), which clarifies that the definitive valuation will be the ex post one where a definitive valuation upon entry to resolution is not possible. 50 The BRRD and EBA's technical standards recognize the ex post valuation approach is important when determining whether "shareholders and creditors do not receive worse treatment under resolution than they would have expected in a counterfactual liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings." 51 Martin Hellwig notes, in a recent study for the EU Parliament, that even this approach will not resolve the problem of attaching realistic calculations to an NCWO test. (2) and (9))....Such valuation consists of two steps: the first requiring the subdivision of creditors into classes, the second establishing an estimate of the treatment that such classes would receive should the institution be put in insolvency...An ex-post definitive valuation is envisaged when the resolution decision has been informed on the basis of a provisional valuation (Article 36 (10) BRRD). The provisional and the ex-post definitive valuation...may yield different results, having regard to the higher granularity of the available information, the valuation approach adopted and the time available....The ex-post definitive valuation may rely on data and information not available to the valuer or the RA when performing the provisional valuation...In accordance with Article 6(e) of that Regulation, the valuation report should explain the differences between the methodologies and assumptions used in the provisional and in the ex-post definitive valuation" at 14-15). Either way, subjectivity and arbitrariness when measuring risk and the illiquidity of nontradable assets will remain, especially when assessing conditional probability distributions of future returns based on unreliable data. Markets may rebound following a downturn to provide reliable mark-to-market data, but in the absence of an arbitrary cut-off date, forbearance is no panacea.
the bank and its assets are likely to be integrated into the purchaser's business so that no additional information about the assets, let alone the proceeds of a potential liquidation is generated" at 13-14). 53 A temporary freeze on payments is discussed in the Bank of England's approach to resolution. 54 Hellwig, supra note 52 at 15. 55 The heads of state and government of the 19 Euro-area countries endorsed a package of proposals on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at the Euro Summit on 14 December 2018. Proposals included the introduction of the common backstop for the SRF provided by the ESM. 56 The size of the credit line will be aligned with the SRF funds, which by 2024 will be around €60 billion, or one percent of covered deposits in the Banking Union. If the credit line is used, the SRF will pay back the ESM loan with money from bank contributions within three years, although this period can be extended up to another two years. Disbursements under the common backstop will be approved by the ESM board of directors, consisting of high-level officials from the 19 Euro-area finance ministries, by mutual agreement. Procedures will be in place so that such approval can be made swiftly and efficiently (in as little as 12 hours) in strict confidentiality because of the sensitive nature of the data. The council realized that the funding was inadequate, and the issue of "liquidity provision in resolution" will be discussed further in 2019.
Liquidity Support in Resolution
The EU approach to bail-ins increases the significance of liquidity support. The European Council decision to allow the ESM to lend money to the SRF to fund resolutions is important in acknowledging the existence of the problem. It is also a positive step that ESM provision of liquidity to the SRF will not be subject to ESM conditionality like sovereign funding. However, this facility will be limited by the size of the SRF reserves. We suggest that further liquidity could be provided by the ECB either to each legal entity, against the entity's collateral available to that entity, or channelled through a parent company. Typically, a G-SIFI is funded mostly through retail and other short-term deposits, which, in the event of a bail-in, could either dry up or even be withdrawn. Thus, a G-SIFI in resolution may require considerable official liquidity support. This should only be provided on a fully collateralized basis, with appropriate haircuts applied to the collateral, to reduce the risk of loss, but this depends on the adequacy of available collateral.
Lender of last resort (LoLR) liquidity is provided alongside other measures to stabilize a failing bank. These financial stability measures may not prevent the bank from entering resolution.
The United Kingdom has a liquidity framework that allows HM Treasury to indemnify the central bank (Bank of England) when a loss is incurred from funding a bank in resolution (for example, a bridge bank). 57 If a central bank provides liquidity to fund a resolution, this may not qualify as LoLR finance but rather as state aid, which could require high-grade collateral.
By this stage of the resolution process, some bank assets will be impaired, and the scope of central bank liquidity provided to a bank entering resolution would be uncertain, especially in the absence of a state indemnity facility.
The BRRD provides that resolution is primarily financed by national resolution funds that can also borrow from each other. 58 The Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) 59 will have to contribute for the purpose of ensuring continuous access to covered deposits and the requisite contributions will be in cash for an amount equivalent to the losses that the DGS would have had to bear in normal insolvency proceedings. Namely, the DGS contribution is made in cash in order to absorb the losses incurred from the covered deposits. an environment where bank balance sheets are rather homogeneous. In our view, the UK's arrangements should also be followed in the EBU with an ESM backstop, in the form of a longterm indemnity, offered to the ECB to provide liquidity in resolution, whenever other arrangements for down-streaming liquidity come short.
Post bail-in bank funding
Market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have to be quickly restored in order to preserve franchise value and reimburse official liquidity support. 62 This is mostly dependent on how fast the bank's capital structure will be rebuilt or the establishment of a strongly is much greater when banks and creditors have experienced large losses from the triggering of, and subsequent, bail-in rounds. 65 Resolution regimes that aim to restore systemic stability to serve their macroprudential objectives should also address the question of what happens when a bank exits the resolution stage, post-bail-in, and is returned to the regulator's custody, but market funding for it remains scarce. 66 While the aim of the bail-in is that the bank itself (in the EU framework) or its successor exit resolution as a going concern, 67 the possibility that the bank might face market reluctance to fund it, for example, due to reputation shocks and funders' behavioural constraints, 68 should not be discounted.
There are two possible approaches to post-resolution funding. The first would use the central bank to provide liquidity support as the LoLR. Arguably, liquidity support in this case could lead to avoidance of future bail-in rounds 69 and thus act as a solvency prop. In addition, LoLR funding at this early stage would come with a certain stigma attached. The second is funding the post-resolution bank through a pre-committed collateralised facility.
In the opinion of the first author this could be done through fully collateralised bonds issued post-resolution to institutional investors that have committed to funding the facility ex ante. 70 Such a facility has the dual advantage of preventing any post-resolution creditor runs while substantially resolving the bank funding needs. The costs of such a funding scheme would depend on how successful the preceding resolution has been augmenting the incentives of the resolution authority and other relevant parties to handle resolutions with due concern to ex post market reactions. The second approach is also a fiscally neutral position, even though in the case of the EBU the ESM could be used as a guarantor of the first tranche of such bonds, which, however, would inevitably result in over-collateralisation.
Conclusion
This chapter has offered a systematic analysis of the reformed bank resolution regimes considered the key objectives underpinning the new resolution regimes. Despite the progress made in key jurisdictions (for example, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union) the chapter has identified persistent problems with the application of contemporary resolution frameworks especially in the European Union. It has also highlighted the confusing nature of the explicit and implicit objectives pursued by reformed resolution regimes. Relevant analysis has particularly focused on the shortcomings of bail-in regimes in the pursuit of macroprudential objectives and the mitigation of moral hazard. Funding in resolution requires a more liberal liquidity regime to provide the desired stabilizing effect.
However, resolution regimes per se cannot stabilize the banking system. Tax regime reforms, ex post penalties for bank management, increasing the liability of key shareholders and measuring more accurately the impact of very low interest rates on bank balance sheets are all equally important elements that need to be considered to ameliorate the TBTF effect and strengthen financial stability.
